Russia further delays delivery of Admiral Gorshkov to India

Russia on Wednesday announced that there would be further delay in delivering the trouble-plagued aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov to India.

Moscow said that it would take at least a year for the aircraft carrier to be delivered to the Indian Navy.

The news is a blow to India's efforts to quickly build up its naval strength, as increasingly assertive China expands itsmaritime reach.

The 2.3 billion dollar aircraft carrier is being reconditioned and was due to be ready this year, but problems with the ship's boilers have pushed the delivery date back several times.

Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said at a joint news conference with his Indian counterpart A.K. Antony, that the delivery of the Admiral Gorshkov would happen in the fourth quarter of 2013, and was a top priority for Russia.

"In the naval domain, we have produced a frigate for the needs of the Indian Navy. We have delivered it to the port at Mumbai this year. By the end of this year, we are expecting to deliver another frigate, and then the third will come in 2013. But of course, the utmost attention is placed upon refitting and refurbishing the heavy aircraft carrying cruiser, the Admiral Gorshkov," Serdyukov added.

The Admiral Gorshkov is to be renamed as the INS Vikramaditya and the success of the order is seen as an important test of defence ties between Russia, the world's second-largest arms exporter, and its biggest customer.

India, a big buyer of Soviet Union weaponry, still relies on Russia for 60 percent of its arms purchases, but has diversified its suppliers in recent years. Israel is now the No. 2 seller, and countries like the United States and France also increasing their presence.

India is closely watching the Chinese Navy's newly assertive stance in the South China Sea and in a dispute with Japan over contested islands that have raised tensions in East Asia this year.

Wary of China's might, a host of south-east Asian nations have ramped up their maritime defence spending.

Antony said he had conveyed "serious concern" at the delays to Serdyukov. He said he was putting pressure on both sides to finish work on the boilers as soon as possible, but said he had not discussed penalising Russia so far.

"The Admiral Gorshkov is the most important concern of India and our government, and also the navy. In all our meetings, we have conveyed our serious concern about the delay," Antony said.

The bilateral meeting precedes a visit by Russian President Putin to New Delhi on November 1.

India bought its first, British-built aircraft carrier in the 1960s, which was decommissioned in 1997. Another ex-British carrier, the INS Viraat, is in operation but is reaching the end of its useful service.

Last month, at a time of high tensions with Japan over the islands, China put its first-ever aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, into service.

Itself a reconditioned vessel from the Ukraine, the Liaoning will be used mostly for training and testing ahead of the possible launch of China's first domestically built carriers after 2015, analysts say.

India plans to spend about 100 billion dollars over the next 10 years to upgrade its largely Soviet-era military equipment.

Apart from Vikramaditya, traditional India is also buying or planning to buy stealth fighters, warships, nuclear-powered submarines and tanks from Russia.

Serdyukov said that production of the fifth generation stealth fighter, the Sukhoi T-50, which it is jointly developing with India, is expected to start in 2020.

He said 1,000 units of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, another joint venture, are being built. He said a new faster version of the weapon, which can reportedly travel at seven times the speed of sound, is being developed. (ANI)

New Destroyer Signals Chinese Naval Shift

For The Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time Report, Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson discuss the implications of the recent launch of China’s new destroyer, called the Type 052D Luyang III-class, which may signal a move to higher standards as the People’s Liberation Army Navy looks to replace old ships entering obsolescence:

The Type 052D’s emergence suggests that China’s naval shipbuilding capability is maturing further, with China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) ‘s new shipyard on Shanghai’s Changxing Island becoming a capable facility for constructing modern surface combatants. It offers further evidence that China can produce warships quickly using modular construction techniques and perhaps other advantages such as lower cost labor than its competitors can access. Series production tends to reduce unit costs because shipyard workers and suppliers find ways to increase efficiency as they spend significant time and energy on the same tasks and improve their operational practices.

Analysis by RAND (pdf) demonstrates that doubling the procurement rate of warships in the U.S. decreased unit costs by 10%. Given that Chinese shipbuilders are still building up their modern naval construction industrial base, the efficiency gains in China are likely to be larger as domestic efficiency increases and Chinese manufacturers displace foreign parts that may cost more.

…

A host of important questions remain regarding the Type 052D, the answers to which would help military planners and policymakers outside of China better understand the impact that the ship is likely to have. The answers to many of these questions—for instance, how good shipboard electronics systems are and how well crews can use their ship to fight modern battles—will become clearer over time as the PLAN makes decisions regarding operational approaches and training intensity and more Chinese sailors gain experience through both tours in the Gulf of Aden and exercises closer to home.

The Type 052D appears to be a very modern warship that, with continued improvements in China’s maritime surveillance and targeting infrastructure and more intensive training of crews, can help make the PLA Navy even more formidable throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Regional neighbors such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea are likely to respond by augmenting their own navies and reaffirming diplomatic and security ties with the U.S.

Last month, China also formally commissioned its first aircraft carrier after months of sea trials. Erickson and Collins wrote that the debut of the ship, called the “Liaoning” by China’s Ministry of National Defense,“matters both symbolically and in terms of China’s naval power and regional influence”. From The Wall Street Journal:

China’s maritime neighbors in Southeast Asia, as well as Japan, India, South Korea, Russia, Australia and the U.S. will pay especially close attention. With Liaoning officially in the fleet, the next questions that China’s military and civilian leaders must grapple with are, first, how to use the ship; second, how many more carriers to build; and third, how to protect it from the increasingly capable anti-ship weapons being acquired by neighbors such as Vietnam, which is due to take delivery of its first Russian Kilo-class diesel attack submarine by the end of 2012. The Liaoning’s existence will likely impel China to develop more advanced surface combatants and anti-submarine forces to protect the symbolically valuable, but operationally vulnerable, asset.

At present, the Liaoning remains first and foremost an emblem of future Chinese sea power. All of its 10 sea trials to date have occurred well within Chinese waters. Chinese naval aircraft have not achieved the basic milestone of landing on its deck with the help of arrestor wires, or “traps,” a process that their American counterparts have been perfecting for decades.

Yet, while the Liaoning’s capabilities will remain modest for the foreseeable future, it will be watched carefully as an important symbol of Beijing’s intentions. As Rear Admiral Yang Yi wrote in a commentary published immediately after the commissioning was made public: “In order to counterbalance the theory that its new aircraft carrier is a threat, China must not only continue to make clear its strategies and policies, it must also take practical actions to convince the world that with the development of China’s military strength, especially the strengthening of its overseas projection capability, it will enhance its role as a defender of regional stability and world peace.”

Navy Lasers’ First Target: Enemy Drones

In an undated photograph, a BQM-147a Dragon drone shows damage after getting shot by a Navy laser weapon in China Lake, California. Photo: U.S. Navy

One of the first tasks the Navy expects to assign its forthcoming arsenal of laser guns: shooting down drones that menace its ships.

The Navy is confident that laser cannons will move out of science fiction and onto the decks of its surface ships by the end of the decade. Its futurists at the Office of Naval Research still have visions of scalable laser blasts that can fry an incoming missile at the rate of 20 feet of steel per second. But now that laser guns are approaching reality, Pentagon officials are starting to consider the practicalities of what they’ll be used for, and they’re not thinking missiles — yet. Among their initial missions will be the relatively easier task of tracking and destroying unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, that fly too close to Navy ships.

Attacking drones is “a near-term application for the type of lasers we’re talking about,” says David Stoudt, a Pentagon policy official. “If you’ve got a UAV coming at a ship,” he explains, “maybe you use the laser for UAVs and keep your missiles for higher-end threats.”

Stoudt, the Pentagon policy office’s senior director for naval capabilities and readiness, chairs a relatively new steering group inside the Navy and Marine Corps that’s thinking through exactly how they’ll use this new “directed energy” technology — i.e., lasers and other ray guns. It’s got some bureaucratic heft to it: About 20 to 25 admirals and generals sit on it; and below them, another 150 to 175 captains and other officers of lower rank, from across the fleet and the Corps, comprise a working group that fills in some of the detail.

“What it gets down to is the topic of lethality,” Stoudt explains in an interview in his Pentagon office. “What are you going to try to shoot with this laser system? Ultimately, what kind of power density does it require on the target? What is the tactical scenario that you’re going to be in?” Pointing your index finger and going pew-pew-pew, it turns out, is not an answer.

Lasers have been promised — and promised, and promised — as a holy-grail weapon for decades, with little to show for it outside a laboratory. Congress is skeptical, particularly about the most advanced laser systems, and is starting to warn the Navy that it needs to design newer destroyers with sufficient power generation to fill the focused-light magazine of its lasers without draining juice from a ship’s propulsion systems. Nor do sailors think of lasers as combat weapons, Stoudt says, and so his working group pulls them together to teach them “you can do this, you can’t do that.” The easiest way to snuff out the laser guns right when they finally look like realistic weapons is to overpromise on what they can do, and under-deliver.

Which makes shooting down drones seem like a risky choice to lead off with — exactly the kind of thing that, should it fail, would make the Navy’s laser program look like a very expensive, nerdy amateur hour. Stoudt is undeterred. He’s convinced that the solid-state lasers that the Navy is looking to use in its first wave of laser weaponry can handle the challenge, even though testing has yet to generate a beam of 100 kilowatts of energy, which the Office of Naval Research’s futurists estimate is desirable for weaponization.

Stoudt points to tests the Navy’s conducted at its surface-warfare proving ground in Dahlgren, Virginia that have pit lasers against drones. Neither he nor Dahlgren officials nor the Navy’s aviation command would say much about the tests. (“We’ve had multiple UAV engagements that were successful,” is about as much as Stoudt will elaborate.) But some information on them has become public.

In 2009, an Air Force laser weapon shot down five robotic planes with a beam of a mere 2.5 kilowatt intensity during a California test. The following year, a Phalanx gun tricked out with a laser beam “successfully tracked, engaged, and destroyed” a drone in flight over the sea, the Navy’s sea-systems command boasted.

And while it’s not a drone test, it’s worth noting that the Maritime Laser Demonstrator, a decommissioned destroyer used to test laser weapons, last year blasted away the outboard motor of a moving boat in California waters from a mile’s distance in choppy waters. That solid-state laser used a beam of merely 15 kilowatts — which the proud director of the Office of Naval Research noted at the time, “can be operated in existing power levels and cooling levels on ships today.”

Blasting drones is just one of the initial tasks Stoudt’s group envisions for first-wave lasers. “Early applications will focus on supporting forward deployed forces to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); artillery, mortars, and rockets; intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems; fast-attack craft; fixed and rotary-wing aviation; and subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles,” reads a passage from a document his working group finalized and quietly circulated in January, called A Directed Energy Vision for U.S. Naval Forces, and acquired by Danger Room.

That’s not going to mean that the first wave of Navy lasers will blast insurgent bombs out of the ground. Stoudt and his team are talking more about using the laser’s capabilities for identifying all this stuff, and then aiding existing, conventional weaponry in attacking it. “Ultimately, this laser will have an excellent telescope and great sensors associated with it,” Stoudt says, “and what you can do with that in terms of combat ID is really rather remarkable.”

In other words, it’s a mistake to think of laser guns as taking the place of traditional weapons, Starship Troopers style. They’re going to work in tandem, especially in their early phases. The old school weapons will still take on the bigger adversaries, like enemy ships. But for smaller attackers, there may be a new way soon to ward them off — one that relies on focused light, not hardened metal.

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Video: Congress Tries to Force U.S. Army to Accept New Tanks on Behalf of Defense Contractors

More than 2,000 M-1 Abrams tanks are sitting in a parking lot in Herlong, California because of a disagreement between the U.S. Army, Congress and the military industrial complex.

The U.S. Army's chief of staff General Raymond T. Odierno told Congress, earlier this year, that the U.S. has more than enough combat tanks and the U.S. Army can save taxpayers as much as $3 billion if they do not off repair, or make new tanks, for three years when new technologies are expected, reports CNN (video below).

However, 173 House Democrats and Republicans are urging Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, to support their decision to produce more unwanted tanks.

The 173 members of Congress claim that if the U.S. Army stops tank production and repair, the actions will damage the nation's economy.

While Congress claims they are worried about the economy, their fears seem to be about the military industrial complex. Defense contractor General Dynamics, which builds tanks, gives contributions to Congress when votes come up on weaponry.

Rep. Buck McKeon, Chairman of the House armed services committee, actually told CNN that he didn't know General Dynamics had given him $56,000 in campaign contributions since 2009.

Rep. Silvestre Reyes, who has received $64,000 from General Dynamics since 2001, said he is worried about the workforce if General Dynamics' Lima, California plant is closed for three years.

The US Army Finally Put a GIANT LASER CANNON on a Truck

It’s been 114 years since Orson Welles first described the nefarious “Heat Ray” in The War of the Worlds. And finally—finally—the US military is on the cusp of deploying a mobile high energy weapon of its very own. Luckily, ours is designed to fry incoming artillery and mortar threats, not the whole of a freshly-conquered civilisation.

The US military has been working on various iterations of laser-based weapons since the mid-1990s, but development has been slow going. Transitioning laser technology from a lab setting to active combat is no easy feat. Recently, though, the Defense Department shifted development funding from messy liquid-based lasers to the more portable and stable solid-state variety, a move that is already paying dividends. Northrop Grumman showcased its 13.4KW Gamma laser cannon in May, and the Navy set dinghies alight with itsMaritime Laser Demonstrator in 2011, Then, last week, Boeing showed off what is essentially a laser cannon on wheels: The High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD).

The HEL MD is currently in Phase II of its development. The High Energy Laser Technology Demonstrator (HEL TD) vehicle was developed during Phase I. Now, funded by a contract $38 million contract by the US Army, a 10KW solid state laser will be installed atop the vehicle, an eight-wheeled Oshkosh Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, with a 500 hp Caterpillar C-15 engine capable of toting up to 16.5 tons.

Sitting atop the demonstrator vehicle’s roof, like the eye of Sauron, is the HEL MD’s beam director, a dome-shaped turret. It will aim and focus the 10KW (and eventually 100KW) laser beams to provide 360-degree and full-sky fire cover. At the White Sands missile test range last year, designers confirmed the system’s ability to effectively acquire, track and target moving projectiles.

As a self-contained system with a virtually unlimited supply of ammo (assuming you don’t run out of electricity), the HEL MD is designed primarily for use in Forward Operating Bases, port installations, and air bases. It will defend against incoming rockets, artillery fire, and mortar rounds.

These weapons have been giving military defenses fits since their advent, because they do not generally require a line of sight to engage. Plush, the shot stays airborne for such a short duration that a near-instant counter is necessary. The HEL MD’s ability to track both hot (rocket-propelled) and cold threats—combined with its shots travelling at the speed of light—could soon provide a nearly-impenetrable defense. What’s more, the massive 50 cm aperture and on-board targeting optics should allow the next HEL MD iteration to pull double duty for ISR missions and as a ground-based UAV hunter.

“The Boeing HEL MD program is applying the best of solid-state laser technology to ensure the Army has speed-of-light capability to defend against rockets, artillery, mortars, and unmanned aerial threats — both today and into the future,” Mike Rinn, Boeing Directed Energy Systems vice president and program director, said in a press statement.

Phase II testing is expected to continue for another three years and, by 2018, Boeing hopes to have the finished system ready for Army review. If Army brass signs off at that point, our next conflict will have a lot more Pew-Pewing.

US army's secret 'flying saucer' schematic from 1950s declassified

Pipedream: The US Air Force had detailed plans in 1956 for a flying saucer that could travel four times the speed of sound. Source: blogs.archives.gov Source: Supplied

THE US army was planning to build a supersonic "flying saucer" in the 1950s, newly declassified documents reveal.

Documents from the US Air Force Aeronautical Systems were recently published by the National Declassification Centre revealing the secret plans known as "Project 1794".

The cover of a "Final Development Summary Report" from 1956 shows an illustration of a flying saucer of the kind made popular in science fiction movies from the 1950s.

A Canadian company, Avro Aircraft Ltd, had been commissioned to construct a prototype of the disc-shaped craft.

It was designed to take off vertically and would have a top speed of Mach 4, a maximum altitude of 30km and a range of over 1000 nautical miles.

Technical schematics reveals one version of the craft which would only have been big enough for a single pilot, and another with a bigger cockpit.

The document concluded that the project was "feasible and the aircraft can be designed to have satisfactory handling through the whole flight range from ground cushion take-off to supersonic flight at very high altitude".

It estimated that it would cost another $US3 million to take the project to a prototype, two years later.

However, as a subsequent video reveals, the prototype literally almost failed to get off the ground, and the project was eventually cancelled in 1960

US Army spends hundreds of thousands advancing fog-like obscurants

The US Army has given firms three grants to upgrade flare systems used to mask the heat signature of prized fighting machines. The heat-seeking chemical, used for the past 60 years, has been deemed dangerous to health and the environment.

Three private companies – Lynntech, Inc., Nanotrons and Physical Sciences – will be in charge of developing new countermeasures, to replace weapons that have been accused of releasing harmful copper into the air when a smoke bomb is detonated.The US government will give the firms around $100,000 to complete the task.

The “dust clouds”, which aim to impede the ability of heat seeking weapons to detect heat signatures, can have adverse health effects on whoever inhales the smoke particles. Most obscurants used today are made from metal particles – often bronze – and have “significant environmental persistence that may pose health hazards,” Wired reports.

Ingesting too much copper, which is found in bronze, can cause gastrointestinal health problems and in serious cases lead to liver and kidney damage. Inhaling copper particles can also cause respiratory irritation, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

A study by the National Academies Press found that exposure to the toxic smoke from obscurants causes pulmonary congestion, alveolitis, chronic pneumonia, and lung inflammation.

But smoke screens have been used since the 1950’s to allow the US military to hide from missiles. The heat-seeking chemicals form metallic dust clouds around equipment that emits infrared radiation, masking prized assets such as tanks, planes and other military hardware.Military planes also deploy flares to divert missiles heading their way.

“To block infrared, you fill a grenade with bronze flakes and detonate it,” near the object you want to hide, said scientist John Lennhoff, who works for a company hired to develop the obscurant.

The US Army is now spending about $300,000 to develop better obscurants, which the government hopes will consist of a less dangerous chemical compound.

RT

1962 India-China war: Why India needed that jolt

Indian jawans patrolling the Pangong shore in Ladakh

The Sino-Indian War of 1962 is not a happy memory. It is remembered for the humiliation of India's total defeat, the betrayal of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai and the devastating personal blow it dealt Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehru. It left us minus large chunks of territory and an inability to admit this that has resulted in the ridiculous policy of having to stamp every book and magazine that does admit this with the assertion that they are incorrect.



From October 20 when the Chinese launched attacks in the west (Aksai Chin) and east (Northeast Frontier Agency, or Nefa, today's Arunachal Pradesh) till November 19 when Premier Zhou En-lai announced a unilateral ceasefire, the war lasted less than a month, yet ended an era.

The taint of 1962 has coloured all its retellings, which have tended to be dominated by vested interests: army generals seeking to exculpate themselves, anti-Nehruvians revelling in his discomfiture, leftists trying to square their dilemma by justifying the Chinese action. Yet 50 years later it is time to look at it again and see if, in fact, its effects were as calamitous as they seemed at that time.

Fractured Country

Early 1962 saw India's third general election, which the Congress won easily. Yet the election was unsettlingly divisive, with old Congress stalwarts like JB Kripalani and C Rajagopalachari turning against the party. Kripalani's battle, in North Bombay, was particularly bruising, since it pitted him against VK Krishna Menon, the defence minister, whose arrogance, apparently impregnable closeness to Nehru and violent anti-Americanism had made him much disliked and distrusted both abroad and in India, including by many Congress colleagues. But Nehru threw his weight behind Menon's campaign and he won a sweeping victory.

The election also brought to parliament the Akali Dal and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), new parties with troubling agendas. The Akalis wanted a Sikh majority state while the DMK wanted an even more ambitious Dravida Nadu to unite the southern states in some semblance of independence. Coming soon after the agitations that lead to linguistic states in 1956, and the division of Bombay into Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960, and along with deep unrest in Nagaland, this raised the spectre of regional disintegration of India. The Congress response was to push the 16th Amendment which made it obligatory for public officials to swear allegiance to the Republic of India.

The Communist Party of India (CPI) came second in the elections, with 29 seats to the Congress' 361. This made them the lead Opposition party, but also bought their internal divisions to the fore. Under the moderate and nationalist SA Dange the CPI had occasionally supported Nehru, but this policy was now strongly challenged by a hard-left faction lead by younger leaders like Jyoti Basu and Harkishan Singh Surjeet (ironically, both advocates of left moderation in later life). According to declassified CIA files on the CPI, another divisive issue was, prophetically, the Indo-China border, where the hard left voted to support the Chinese position.

Debates, and More Debates

This was at a meeting in 1961, which shows how one part of the mythology that has grown around the 1962 war, which is that it was a total surprise, is incorrect. In fact, the border dispute and the ongoing skirmishes linked to it had been the subject of much debate in the Indian parliament and media. Parties like the Jana Sangh, still in disrepute due to alleged links with the Hindu extremists who killed Gandhi, seized the nationalist card as a way to raise their profile — one ardent anti-China advocate was a young Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The media too, already charged by the Indian takeover of Goa in late 1961, was also inclined to be unyielding on the border.

Ramachandra Guha, in his history of independent India, quotes Steve Hoffman's work which suggests that the Indian government's policy of dealing with an issue by producing white papers for debate was a constraint: "Had the border dispute remained private the prime minister could have used the quieter back-channels of diplomatic compromise." With parliament and media in full cry Nehru would have found it hard to do this, though this wasn't something the Chinese were inclined to appreciate. But even when private talks between Nehru and Chou took place in 1960 there was a basic difference in attitude which may have prevented a solution.

The Chinese position all along was pragmatic: they wanted a route to Tibet through Aksai Chin and were not interested in whether the facts of history, in a region where this had always been unclear, supported them. Guha refers to secret records of the talks which show Chou stating, fairly clearly, that China would give up claims to Nefa in exchange for Aksai Chin. But Nehru insisted on defending the details of history, like the McMahon Line and historical texts that referred to the area. This may have been from consideration for public sentiment, or for the Dalai Lama who had taken refuge in India (another flashpoint for the Chinese), but it also possibly stemmed from his image of being a principled international statesman.

Verbal Volleys

Almost every account of modern international diplomacy admits to one feeling about Indian leaders: exasperation at how much they lectured the rest of the world. Nehru's high reputation meant that he was always listened to with real respect, but this was wearing thin, and his peremptory action in Goa raised charges of hypocrisy that were hard to duck. Even more, Menon's diatribes had annoyed people like the Americans beyond endurance

A mix of competition & engagement ahead

With 65% of India under 35 years of age, memories of the bloody skirmishes on the disputed Himalayan borders between Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) and Indian Army fifty years ago in autumn of 1962 have almost faded for an average Indian. For even the middle-aged India, the war, which left more than 1382 Indian soldiers killed, thousands wounded, missing or captured by PLA and led to a comprehensive humiliating defeat in November, 1962, is perhaps better understood through late director Chetan Anand's 1964 war epic "Haqeeqat (truth)."

Replete with mellifluous songs, the movie filmed in Ladakh with support of Indian Defence Ministry is full of patriotic ethos and "do or die" valour of Indian troops against the deceitful marauding Chinese who abuse the "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" slogan of the early Nehruvian days.

The brutal truth, however, is hidden far away from the eyes of an average Indian and in the innards of Indian defence establishment in South Block in the form of two top secret copies of Lieutenant General Henderson Brooks - Brigadier PS Bhagat report on the '62 debacle. Kept away inside a series of lockers in the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) and in a vault in the Defence Secretary's office, the report, typed in full scape paper, is never to be revealed. The Brooks-Bhagat report tears into the Indian Army leadership during the 1962 war, singling out then defence minister VK Krishna Menon favourite Tezpur based IV Corps Commander Brij Mohan Kaul, who virtually ran the war from his sick-bed from what is now 5, Motilal Nehru Marg, and Major General AS Pathania, Commander of the much decorated Fourth Infantry Division, who ordered the troop withdrawal from then called North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) out of fear of the invading PLA.

Laced with quotes from victorious Generals from the west and quotes from leading war strategists of the past, the Brooks-Bhagat report castigates the Indian Army brass for total failure of command and control, with a sick Kaul being replaced by Lt General Harbaksh Singh and then staging a comeback again in midst of a month long war, and the then Intelligence Bureau Chief BN Mullick for failure to read the enemy moves. While the Army brass does not want its humiliation to come out, the then Indian political leadership has not been spared in a 40-page top secret note written on the Brooks-Bhagat report by then Army Chief JN Chaudhuri, who replaced a largely ineffective General PN Thapar a day after Zhou Enlai government offered a humiliating ceasefire to Indian charge d' affairs P K Bannerjee in Peking on November 19, 1962.

Gifted with good writing skills, Gen Chaudhuri goes for the jugular of the then defence minister VK Krishna Menon for interference in Indian Army's operational affairs during war and Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru for a poorly strategized "forward policy" towards Tibet. The report and appended note makes it evident that 1962 debacle was due to political leaders playing Don Quixote and Indian Army Generals their Sancho Panza. The net result was that PLA occupied Tawang on October 23, 1962 after launching attacks on October 19 at Bum La and Thag La, and threatened to take over Tezpur in NEFA before announcing unilateral withdrawal on November 21.

The situation in the Ladakh sector was a trifle better with the then Western Army Commander Lt General Daulat Singh quietly lifting three additional battalions from Pakistan borders and deploying them in defence of Chushul. The battle of Rezang La near Chushul on November 18, 1962 and the valiant sacrifice of Major Shaitan Singh and his 109 men of Charlie Company of  13 Kumaon battalion ensured that PLA could not threaten Leh.

The Indian humiliation in 1962 is exemplified by now declassified November 19, 1962 letter from Nehru to US President John Kennedy asking for American air support as the Chinese were threatening to take over entire east India and run over Leh in Ladakh sector. It is a matter of record that American based a squadron of C-130 Hercules in Palam under Brigadier General Paul W Tibbets, who had flown Enola Gay to drop the Hiroshima bomb on August 6, 1945,  to help Indian war replenishment for a year from December, 1962.

While PM Nehru's "Forward Policy" just before the war essentially designed to claim Indian territory as demarcated by McMahon (after Sir Henry McMahon)  Line under the Simla Accord in 1914 in NEFA and Johnson (after W H Johnson) Line in Aksai Chin in 1865, he firmly believed that China under Mao Zedong would not escalate matters as New Delhi had already recognized Tibet as part of Peoples Republic of China in 1954. Mao, however, used the 1959 revolt in Lhasa and Nehru giving political asylum to 14th Dalai Lama as an excuse to launch hostilities against India.

The 1962 war was the end of Chinese century of humiliations and comeback from Mao, who had been relegated to second line of leadership after the failed cultural revolution of the 1950s. The Indian defeat also signaled the fall of Nehru. The war had actually a fait accompli after the pathetic Indian intelligence failed in picking up the construction of Xinjiang-Tibet Highway after occupying 38,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in Aksai Chin. India woke up after Zhou Enlai declared the highway open in 1957 and later offered Nehru " as it is where it is" boundary settlement in 1960.

The Chinese position on boundary settlement was similarly reiterated in 1979 and 1985 but changed in 1987 when they conveyed to Indian Secretary (East) A P Venkateswaran that even the eastern sector had to be negotiated. In 2003, both countries set up a special representative level dialogue to resolve the 3,488 kilometer Line of Actual Control (LAC) through a political perspective but Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao took a turn again in 2010 when he said that boundary dispute will take a long time to solve.

In the meantime, China build a railroad from Qinghai to Lhasa, upgraded infrastructure with some 70,000 kilometers of roads and consolidated its hold over a restive Tibet with a capability to push as many as half a million troops on Indian borders within 23 days. There have been serious transgression on the LAC since the 2008 revolt in Lhasa and the Indian side has been forced to respond in terms of military capability and border infrastructure.

Despite the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquilty Agreement in place, there is serious trust deficit between the two countries due to unresolved border, Beijing's all weather relationship with Pakistan and strategic encirclement of India, and the continued resonance of the Dalai Lama factor in Tibet. Even though India-China trade is already touching USD 74 billion dollars and zooming towards the USC 100 billion mark, there is marked tension on the LAC which could lead to a military accident."

Just as India and China had collaborated on climate change and other development issues, there is a need for Beijing to build trust by helping New Delhi  into the expanded UN Security Council in return for infrastructure building contracts in India in times of slow economic growth and excess capacities lying idle. War is not an option with both countries equipped with inter-continental ballistic missiles and second strike capability," said a senior Indian official.

While the young India may have forgotten the China war, the '62 conflict has deeply impacted the Indian Army psyche as the Fourth India Division now only does training courses in Allahabad after its decimation at Namka Chu, Thag La and Tawang in NEFA fifty years ago. It is time that both countries resolved the boundary dispute and heal the wounds of 1962 to move forward.

Recalling the 1962 conflict

Shyam Saran, PM envoy (2006-2010), foreign secretary (2004-2006)

The India-China war of 1962 continues to colour perceptions the two countries have of each other. There is a deep-seated wariness on the Indian side about Chinese intentions. The Chinese, on the other hand, are generally dismissive of Indian capabilities and concerns. These perceptions are likely to persist as long as the border issue remains unsettled and the Tibet issue continues to fester in the background.

It is now clear that the border issue became elevated to a strategic confrontation once the Tibetan revolt erupted in 1959 and the Dalai Lama sought and obtained shelter in India. India is better prepared today to meet a Chinese military threat on its borders, but "better" does not mean "well-prepared". A lot more effort is required to improve our border infrastructure. In parallel, the two countries must grapple with the Tibet issue, moving beyond the formulaic exchanges that have taken place so far. It is unlikely that the border issue will be resolved unless some understanding is reached on managing the Tibet issue in a manner satisfactory to both sides and sensitive to Tibetan sentiments.

In recent exchanges, the Chinese appeared ready to explore this proposition. Going forward, these inter-linked issues must figure prominently on the India-China agenda.

Gen Vijay Kumar Singh, Army Chief (2010-2012)

The 1962 India-China war is an event of great importance in our nation's history. This war proved that idealism does not take a nation anywhere. If a nation wants to find or create a place for itself then it must follow 'realpolitik'.

The confrontation proved that our assessment of China was totally wrong and we were caught unprepared politically, morally and militarily. Despite the fact that the army fought valiantly and there were numerous instances of great sacrifice and bravery the fact that we were not prepared for such a threat came out very vividly. Our intelligence was extremely weak, troops did not have the required quantity and quality of equipment, the infrastructure was non-existent, and above all the decision making setup for defence was run on whims and fancies. We are all too familiar with the reputation of Mr Krishna Menon (then Defence Minister) and the Tezpur Corps Commander Lt Gen B M Kaul episode.

There was a great attempt in the years preceding this to denigrate and run down the armed forces. We need to critically analyse all these and more as we face a resurgent, powerful and strong China. We need to ask ourselves if we have removed all the anomalies that came to fore in 1962. There is a need to introspect and ensure that we do not allow anyone to weaken our preparation and resolve. There is a dire need to proceed with the planned developments in infrastructure and armed forces accretions expeditiously. The bureaucratic mentality to look at everything as if it is a commodity must be shunned and armed forces assessments must be respected as also implemented if we want to avoid the mistakes of 1962. Let us not be lulled into inaction by incompetence to comprehend.

Shashindra Pal Tyagi, Air Chief (2004-2007)

Students of Military History will forever wonder why the IAF was not utilised in the Sino-Indian Conflict in 1962. The reasons are not very clear and the historic data available does not give a clear picture as to why we hesitated to use the Combat elements of our Air Force. There is, however, unanimity among Air Warriors that use of combat air power in 1962 would have had a decisive impact on the Battle. Indeed history might have read somewhat differently.

Why then did we not take the obvious steps? It is said that that the political leadership was worried that the use of air power will escalate the war and Indian cities like Calcutta (that is what it was called then) would be bombed by China and we will have no air defense to protect us.

This was also a strange management of the war where the defence minister was running almost a private war, with not even the Army Chief in the complete picture, as General Kaul was virtually reporting to Mr Menon as a Theater Commander. Since General Kaul did not ask for air power, none was provided. It is highly unlikely that the IAF leadership was seriously consulted.

It is also true that the IAF leadership did not play an active role by suo-moto advising the Government. But then these were strange times and few knew who was in-charge. Nevertheless a lesson was learnt. The only war India has lost after independence is the one in which combat air power was not used. Our borders with China and indeed with the Pakistanis, in what they call the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir( with a small exception of the areas near Jammu), are mainly mountainous. The Armour/tanks cannot operate in such a terrain. Heavy Artillary is difficult to take up the mountains. The infantry/foot soldiers have to move along limited routes largely in the valleys. Air power overcomes the limitations of the terrain and given todays technology the climate/weather (always a challenge in the mountains). Against China we have some advantages of operating from Bases in the plains as opposed to the high altitudes of the Tibetan Plateau. Our Bases for the same reasons are more secure than those of PLAAF. The Chinese infrastructure like railways, pipelines etc are vulnerable to air interdiction. So are their ground troops. The message is clear. The route to security/deterrence is through the medium of air. If we ignore this lesson, history will not forgive us.

Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, Navy Chief (1996-98)

Naval power was not put to test during the 1962 conflict. However, in 1976, the Navy sent a paper to then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi through her advisor G Parthasarthi. Prepared in the Chinese context, the paper suggested that India should take the offer of nuclear submarine from Russia as had been conveyed by Fleet Admiral S G Gorshkov. We said in the paper that nuclear submarine introduces a factor of uncertainty for any super power or any pretender. I think nuclear power submarine and second strike capability is a powerful deterrence to any aggressive moves by our northern neighbour in future.

Indian navy successfully test-fires BrahMos supersonic cruise missile

"The cruise missile was test-fired from guided missile frigate INS Teg--the Indian Navy's latest induction from Russia off the coast of Goa early morning," sources told .

The Navy today successfully test-fired the 290-km range BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, capable of carrying a conventional warhead of 300 kg, from a warship off the Goa coast.

"The cruise missile was test-fired from guided missile frigate INS Teg--the Indian Navy's latest induction from Russia off the coast of Goa early morning," sources told .

They said the missile performing high-level manoeuvres successfully hit the target ship which was still on fire.

The INS Teg, which has been built at the Yantar shipyard in Russia, had fired the missile successfully during pre-induction trials in Russia last year.

The two remaining warships of the project namely INS Tarkah and INS Trikand will also be armed with the lethal missile in vertical launch mode.

The two-stage missile, the first one being solid and the second one ramjet liquid propellant, has already been inducted into the Army and Navy, and the Air Force version is in final stage of trial, a defence official said.

While induction of the first version of Brahmos missile system in the Indian Navy commenced from 2005 with INS Rajput, it is now fully operational with two regiments of the Army.

The air launch version and the submarine launch version of the missile system are in progress, he said.

The Army has so far placed orders for the Brahmos missile to be deployed by three regiments of the Army and two of them have already been inducted operationally.

The Defence Ministry has also given a go-ahead to Army to induct a third regiment equipped with the missile system to be deployed in Arunachal Pradesh.

Brahmos Aerospace, an Indo-Russian joint venture company, is also working to develop the air as well as the submarine launch version of the missile system and work on the project is in progress.

Navy commissions destroyer named after SEAL from NY killed in Afghanistan

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  Oct. 6, 2012: The crew of the USS Michael Murphy mans the ship and brings her to life during the commissioning ceremony for the Navy's newest guided-missile destroyer. (AP)

NEW YORK –  In a ceremony that was more joyful than solemn, the U.S. Navy on Saturday commissioned the USS Michael Murphy, a sleek new warship named for a Navy SEAL who died in Afghanistan at age 29.

Cannons boomed, dignitaries spoke of heroism, and nearly 300 sailors charged up a ramp while a band played "Anchors Aweigh" as the destroyer sprang to life in a ceremony in New York Harbor.

"You are now our family, our team," the ship's commander, Tom Shultz, told Murphy's parents, before leading hundreds of visitors in a SEAL battle cry.

"Hooyah, Michael Murphy!" Shultz said, pointing skyward.

Murphy, a Navy lieutenant who grew up in Patchogue, N.Y., was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during a 2005 ambush. Military officials said that after his four-man team was surrounded, Murphy risked exposure to enemy fire so he could radio a base for help.

The helicopter that rushed to the rescue was shot down, killing 16 sailors and soldiers. Murphy died on the battlefield. Only one man in his squad survived.

The 510-foot ship bearing his name was draped in red, white and blue banners and festooned with flags for Saturday's ceremony on a pier on Manhattan's west side.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus said the ship would guarantee that Murphy's story would be retold. U.S. Rep. Peter King heralded the young sailor for "unbridled courage." U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer recounted stories of how Murphy, since he was a child, had empathy for others.

The $1.1 billion warship, built at the Bath Iron Works in Maine, is to be based in Hawaii.

Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/10/06/navy-commissions-destroyer-named-after-seal-from-ny-killed-in-afghanistan/#ixzz28bZWIAYd