Missile Last updated: November, 2011
Motivated by ongoing hostilities with India, Pakistan embarked upon an intense ballistic missile development program in the early 1980's. [1] Overcoming technical naiveté, substantial disadvantages in infrastructure and human capital relative to India, the imposition of U.S. and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions, and the uncertainties of democratization, Pakistan gained a sophisticated missile arsenal in only 30 years. [2] Breaking down Pakistan's missile development, and its procurement of foreign materials and expertise alongside inter-agency competition, provides important insights into "the way a semi-isolated and poor country still can pursue technically demanding ballistic missile capabilities." [3]
The perceived strategic necessity of displaying the ability to execute a nuclear strike deep within India has sustained Pakistan's interest in medium- and long-range missiles. [4] The Congressional Research Service and other assessments continue to report ongoing Pakistani missile collaborations with China and North Korea. [5] Pakistan also remains a non-signatory to the MTCR, but the last U.S. missile sanction laws against Pakistani entities were waived in 2003. [6] Recent missile developments, such as the April 2011 test-firing of the short-range nuclear capable Hatf-9/NASR missile, indicate potential Pakistani interest in building a tactical nuclear capability. [7] Pakistan considers its nuclear weapons to be national "crown jewels" and likely holds missile delivery systems in a similar regard. Barring substantial changes in South Asian geopolitics, a change in attitude seems unlikely.
Capabilities
The Shaheen solid-fueled MRBM and Ghauri liquid-fueled MRBM series missiles serve as the flagships of Pakistan's current missile deployments. Capable of striking most of India, the Shaheen series missiles are of Chinese M-11 and M-18 lineage, whereas the Ghauri series missiles were built from North Korean Nodong designs. Pakistan more recently unveiled the Babur cruise missile, with mobile land-based launch capabilities, and the Ra'ad cruise missile, with air-based launch capabilities. Analysts believe Pakistan is actively pursuing sea-based and air-based launch platforms for the Babur cruise missile.
History
1960 to 1990: Space Research and a Nascent Missile Program
Pakistan began to develop rocketry expertise in the early 1960s at the Space Sciences Research Wing of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). In September 1961, the PAEC Space Sciences program began sending lead engineers and scientists to the United States for rocket launch training with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). [8] In June 1962, Pakistan successfully launched a two-stage rocket. [9] By the account of at least one U.S. missile proliferation official, Pakistan's sounding rocket program directly enabled its future missile programs. [10]
Functioning de facto as an independent agency since 1964, President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq formally established the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) as Pakistan's national space agency in 1981. [11] In 1989, a year after India's Prithvi test, Pakistan launched the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles. [12] Both American and Indian observers denoted the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 as SUPARCO-modified French sounding rockets. [13] Analysts also concluded that SUPARCO benefited from substantial technical assistance from China. [14]
The Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 suffered from limited range and accuracy. The lack of mass production efforts suggests that Pakistan intended their use primarily as training tools. [15] Thus, despite the successful test-flights of SUPARCO's Hatf-1 and Hatf-2, U.S. assessments into the 1990's continued to name American F-16 combat aircraft sold to Pakistan in the 1980's as Pakistan's most likely nuclear delivery option. [16]
1990 to 2001: Arms Race with India, Interagency Competition, and Foreign Assistance
Despite political reforms during the 1988 to 1990 Benazir Bhutto government, democratization efforts in Pakistan did not moderate the country's zeal for missile acquisition. [17] With the limited scope of the democratization, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a strong ally of Dr. A.Q. Khan, and General Aslam Beg continued to dominate military and national security issues. Insurgency in Kashmir further exacerbated relations with India and strengthened the military's control over nuclear and missile programs. Finally, the relatively unstable political regimes in both India and Pakistan in the early 1990s prevented sustained dialogue and normalization of relations. Thus, democratization failed to abate the organizational, security, and cognitive factors encouraging missile proliferation, and no "democratic peace" occurred in Pakistan.
Unlike India's more regional outlook, Pakistan's security concerns remained focused on the threat from India. Interestingly, however, Indian-Chinese relations indirectly motivated Pakistani missile proliferation. India's disastrous military campaigns against China, and the emergence of a nuclear China in the early 1960s, motivated both an Indian arms build-up as well as India's refusal to participate in missile control agreements absent Chinese participation. [18] The difficult relationship between India and China thus increased the perceived security threat in Pakistan and created an irresolvable logistical hurdle to any India-Pakistan missile control regime. [19]
In 1990, the Bush administration imposed Pressler Amendment sanctions on Pakistan, banning military assistance to Pakistan while it maintained a nuclear weapons program. [20] Pakistani officials, noting the resulting lack of a realistic option for improving Pakistan's limited Air Force and further motivated by the Indian military's continued technological gains, concluded the necessity of intermediate-range missile development. [21] In the decade that followed, intense clandestine missile projects culminated with the successful launch of several intermediate-range missiles. In so doing, Pakistan demonstrated the effectiveness of an organizational structure characterized by contentious interagency competition between the Chinese-assisted solid-fuel PAEC program under Dr. Samar Mubarakmand and the North Korea-assisted liquid-fueled program at Khan Research Lab (KRL) under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. [22]
China, motivated in part by competition with Soviet-armed India, agreed to sell M-11 missiles, launchers, and support equipment to Pakistan in 1988. [23] SUPARCO subsequently surfaced as the destination for numerous illicit materials transfers. In 1995, the United States warned European suppliers of potential illicit procurement attempts. [24] In 1996, Taiwan and Hong Kong seized numerous shipments of several tons of Ammonium perchlorate (AP), a solid-propellant component, bound for SUPARCO from North Korea and routed through China. [25] Intelligence sources also detected numerous M-11 component deliveries to a new missile factory at Tarwanah, which itself bears a strong physical resemblance to the M-11 plant in Hebei, China. [26]
In June 1991, the Bush administration imposed missile sanction laws against SUPARCO and two Chinese firms for M-11 missile technology transfers. [27] In August 1993, the Clinton administration imposed new sanctions after discovering additional M-11 exports to Pakistan. [28] These sanctions weakened Chinese largesse, and Pakistan responded by turning to other sources. [29] In 1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who would come to regard herself as the "mother of the missile program," travelled to Pyongyang and secured the transfer of Nodong missile technology on behalf of Dr. A.Q. Khan and his solid-fueled missile development program at Khan Research Lab (KRL). [30] Fearing obsolescence, and unsuccessful through much of the 1980's, A.Q. Khan leveraged North Korean assistance to quickly transform KRL into a vibrant rival for PAEC. [31] Some report that A.Q. Khan struck additional technology transfer deals with North Korea outside the purview of Pakistan's state negotiations. [32] Circumstantial evidence points to an agreement by either the Pakistani government or A.Q. Khan to exchange nuclear secrets for missile technology. [33]
By the end of the decade, both programs would demonstrate intermediate-range missile launch capabilities. On 3 July 1997, SUPARCO successfully launched the Hatf-3/Ghaznavi missile. Analysts immediately noted design similarities with the Chinese M-11 missile; some even speculated that the Ghaznavi was merely a renamed imported M-11. [34] One year later, KRL test fired the liquid-fueled Hatf-5/Ghauri missile. Winning the race for an intermediate-range missile, KRL's Ghauri brought New Delhi within range. [35] Analysts immediately noted design similarities with the North Korean Nodong missile. [36] A year later, KRL launched the Hatf-5A/Ghauri-2, with increased range capable of striking most of India. A day later, PAEC successfully fired the Hatf-4/Shaheen-1, introducing solid-fueled intermediate-range capabilities to the Pakistani arsenal.
The successful launches of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles occurred nearly concurrently with the debut of India's Prithvi and Agni-2 missiles. The chronology of Pakistani missile tests is consistent with arms competition not only with India, but also between KRL and PAEC.
2001 to 2007: Interagency Harmonization and Technological Maturity
In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf seized power and overhauled Pakistan's nuclear command-and-control structure. [37] While the official justification for the reforms was to "establish harmony between Pakistan's poorly coordinated and competitive" agencies, some speculate that Musharraf also sought to "knock out the one person in Pakistan most likely to eclipse him: the Father of the Bomb."[38] Under the new organizational scheme, weaponization and delivery activities were transferred from PAEC and KRL to the National Development Complex (NDC). [39] While uncertainty exists about whether KRL retained the Ghauri program, NDC nevertheless now stands as Pakistan's primary missile development agency. [40]
The period between 2002 and 2006 marked a flurry of missile test-flights in a "tit-for-tat" pattern with India, with the two countries generally scheduling flight tests within days of each other and often concurrent with politically sensitive events such as elections. [41] In total, three Hatf-3/Abdali tests, six Hatf-4/Shaheen-1 tests, five Hatf-5/Ghauri-1 tests, and five Hatf-6/Shaheen-2 tests occurred. [42] By the conclusion of this period, Pakistan would claim solid-fueled capabilities of 2,000-2,500km range with 1,000kg payload, and liquid-fueled capabilities of 1,300km with a 1,000kg payload, bringing almost all of India within nuclear strike range.
Recent Developments and Current Status
In 2005, India and Pakistan signed an agreement requiring both parties to provide advance notice of any ballistic missile tests. [43] Since 2007, testing activity of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles has slowed and the majority of new developments have appeared in cruise, rather than ballistic missile systems. [44] Potential causes for this include India's investment in a ballistic missile defense system, the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles acquiring sufficient range and payload to target strategic locations in India, international pressure against intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile tests, and a shift in focus toward developing a tactical nuclear capability. [45]
The 2005 inaugural test-flight of the Hatf-7/Babur cruise missile stunned many observers for its technological complexity and its undetected development. [46] The extent of foreign assistance remains unclear —analysts identified design similarities with Chinese cruise missiles as well as American Tomahawk missiles, which previously crash-landed over Pakistan. [47] In 2007, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-8/Ra'ad cruise missile, adding air-launch missile capabilities to the Pakistan Air Force. [48] While Pakistan officially claimed that NDC indigenously developed the Hatf-8, some believe that the modest range of the missile suggests foreign assistance by a country unwilling to contravene MTCR range and payload restrictions. [49] More recently, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-9/NASR, a short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile in April 2011. Observers immediately speculated that the Hatf-9/NASR test indicated potential Pakistani intention to develop a tactical nuclear capability —an interest potentially motivated further by India's "Cold Start" doctrine. [50]
Despite flight test successes, however, analysts remain skeptical about Pakistan's indigenous design and manufacturing capabilities. The lack of robust government-industry-university R&D linkages, a known dependence on foreign suppliers for key raw materials such as steel alloys, and the technological inexperience of private industry cast doubt upon Pakistan's missile design claims. [51] While Pakistani scientists increasingly participate in basic science collaboration with foreign laboratories, such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), the country's industrial base lacks a demonstrated history of producing quality high-tech products. [52] A history of indigenous design claims refuted by intelligence sources further complicates assessments. [53] Analysts estimate that even gaining liquid propulsion expertise will take until at least 2013. [54] Thus, Pakistani missile development will likely remain dependent on foreign assistance for both materials and expertise in the near-term. Nevertheless Pakistan has maintained a successful missile acquisition strategy in spite of foreign dependence and a history of MTCR and U.S. Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act sanctions, and already boasts one of the top ten ballistic missile manufacturing capabilities in the world. [55]
Barring unprecedented industrial growth and a substantially enhanced defense-industrial base, Pakistan will likely continue its strategy of developing advanced missile systems with foreign assistance rather than pursuing the more expensive and less feasible option of pure indigenous development or advanced aircraft acquisition. [56] Continued state patronage, fueled by competition with India, the high prestige accorded to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the symbolic value of diversifying missile delivery systems will likely sustain continued missile development in Pakistan.[57]
Sources:
[1] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 213.
[2] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 118.
[3] Aaron Karp, "The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, pp. 106-122.
[4] Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion," in The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998.
[5] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan," CRS Report for Congress RL31900 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 11 March 2004); Robert Hewson, ed., "Ra'ad (Hatf 8) (Pakistan), Air-to-surface missiles — Stand-off and cruise," Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, December 2010, www.janes.com; Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 277.
[6] Missile Technology Control Regime, "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime: Canberra, Australia, 5-7 November 2008," November 2008, www.mtcr.info; U.S. Department of State, "Missile Sanction Laws," updated 4 December 2009, www.state.gov.
[7] Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011.
[8] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk.
[9] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk.
[10] "Pakistan Derives its First 'Hatf' Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets," The Risk Report, October 1995, p. 4.
[11] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk; The President of Pakistan, "SUPARCO Ordinance No. XX of 1981," Gazette of Pakistan, 21 May 1981.
[12] "Pakistan tests long-range missiles," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 February 1989, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[13] "Pakistan Derives its First 'Hatf' Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets," The Risk Report, October 1995, p. 4; and Subrahmanyan Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," Missile Montior, No 3, Spring 1993, pp. 5-6.
[14] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 213.
[15] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 118.
[16] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 213.
[17] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 125.
[18] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 116.
[19] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 123.
[20] Dianne E. Rennack, "India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress RS20995, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 3 February 2003).
[21] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 122; Dilip Ganguly, "Launch of India's First Intermediate-Range Missile Postponed," Associated Press, 20 April 1989, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; and Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 123.
[22] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009).
[23] Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2001), p. 268.
[24] Abu Sabeen, "Purchase of ballistic missile equipment; Washington warns Islamabad," Middle East Newsfile (Moneyclips), 27 May 1995 in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[25] "Taiwan confiscates chemicals bound for Pakistan," Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 28 March 2006, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; Michelle Chin and Glenn Schloss, "Customs raid uncovers huge haul of rocket fuel," South China Morning Post, 18 September 1996, p. 1; in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; and Glenn Schloss, "North Korean firm behind shipment," South China Morning Post, 13 December 1996, p. 4, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[26] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 119; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Linked To Pakistani Missile Plant; Secret Project Could Renew Sanctions Issue," Washington Post, 25 August 1996, p. A01; in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[27] Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," CRS Report for Congress RL31555, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 16 August 2010).
[28] "Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Chinese and Pakistani Entities," 56 Federal Register 137 (25 June 1991), p. 32601.
[29] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 88.
[30] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), pp. 88-89.
[31] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 89.
[32] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 96.
[33] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 90.
[34] Duncan Lennox, ed., "Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, pp. 111-112; and Duncan Lennox, ed., "Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, pp. 111-112.
[35] Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 268.
[36] "Pakistan's Missile 'was a Nodong,'" Jane's Missiles & Rockets (Surrey), 1 May 1998.
[37] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks —A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 109.
[38] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks —A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 110; and Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 277.
[39] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks —A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 110.
[40] Usman Ansari, "Pakistan Pushes To improve Missile Strike Capability," DefenseNews, 17 November 2008, www.defensenews.com.
[41] "India and Pakistan in tit-for-tat missile tests," The Guardian (London), 4 October 2002, www.guardian.co.uk.
[42] "Missile Flight Tests," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed 31 January 2011, www.iiss.org.
[43] "India, Pakistan sign missile test deal," Associated Press, 3 October 2005.
[44] Farhan Bokhari, "Pakistan test-fires medium-range ballistic missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 December 2010; Farhan Bokhari, "Pakistan test fires Shaheen 2," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 April 2008; and Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[45] Rahul Bedi, "India's AAD missile interceptor completes another successful test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 July 2010; Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011.
[46] Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[47] Robert Hewson and Andrew Koch, "Pakistan tests cruise missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 August 2005; Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[48] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan tests Hatf 8 air-launched cruise missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 September 2007.
[49] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan tests Hatf 8 air-launched cruise missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 September 2007.
[50] Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011; Chris Allbritton, "How Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be jeopardized," Reuters, 1 June 2011, accessed 8 July 2011.
[51] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, p. 19.
[52] "Pakistani, European atomic energy bodies mark 20 years of cooperation," PTV World (Islamabad), 15 December 2004.
[53] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009).
[54] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, p. 23.
[55] Dianne E. Rennack, "India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress RS20995, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 3 February 2003); and Duncan Lennox, ed., "Ballistic Missile Capabilities, Manufacturing Countries,".in Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, p. 553.
[56] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, pp. 16-26.
[57] Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion," in The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998.
Capabilities
The Shaheen solid-fueled MRBM and Ghauri liquid-fueled MRBM series missiles serve as the flagships of Pakistan's current missile deployments. Capable of striking most of India, the Shaheen series missiles are of Chinese M-11 and M-18 lineage, whereas the Ghauri series missiles were built from North Korean Nodong designs. Pakistan more recently unveiled the Babur cruise missile, with mobile land-based launch capabilities, and the Ra'ad cruise missile, with air-based launch capabilities. Analysts believe Pakistan is actively pursuing sea-based and air-based launch platforms for the Babur cruise missile.
History
1960 to 1990: Space Research and a Nascent Missile Program
Pakistan began to develop rocketry expertise in the early 1960s at the Space Sciences Research Wing of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). In September 1961, the PAEC Space Sciences program began sending lead engineers and scientists to the United States for rocket launch training with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). [8] In June 1962, Pakistan successfully launched a two-stage rocket. [9] By the account of at least one U.S. missile proliferation official, Pakistan's sounding rocket program directly enabled its future missile programs. [10]
Functioning de facto as an independent agency since 1964, President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq formally established the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) as Pakistan's national space agency in 1981. [11] In 1989, a year after India's Prithvi test, Pakistan launched the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles. [12] Both American and Indian observers denoted the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 as SUPARCO-modified French sounding rockets. [13] Analysts also concluded that SUPARCO benefited from substantial technical assistance from China. [14]
The Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 suffered from limited range and accuracy. The lack of mass production efforts suggests that Pakistan intended their use primarily as training tools. [15] Thus, despite the successful test-flights of SUPARCO's Hatf-1 and Hatf-2, U.S. assessments into the 1990's continued to name American F-16 combat aircraft sold to Pakistan in the 1980's as Pakistan's most likely nuclear delivery option. [16]
1990 to 2001: Arms Race with India, Interagency Competition, and Foreign Assistance
Despite political reforms during the 1988 to 1990 Benazir Bhutto government, democratization efforts in Pakistan did not moderate the country's zeal for missile acquisition. [17] With the limited scope of the democratization, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a strong ally of Dr. A.Q. Khan, and General Aslam Beg continued to dominate military and national security issues. Insurgency in Kashmir further exacerbated relations with India and strengthened the military's control over nuclear and missile programs. Finally, the relatively unstable political regimes in both India and Pakistan in the early 1990s prevented sustained dialogue and normalization of relations. Thus, democratization failed to abate the organizational, security, and cognitive factors encouraging missile proliferation, and no "democratic peace" occurred in Pakistan.
Unlike India's more regional outlook, Pakistan's security concerns remained focused on the threat from India. Interestingly, however, Indian-Chinese relations indirectly motivated Pakistani missile proliferation. India's disastrous military campaigns against China, and the emergence of a nuclear China in the early 1960s, motivated both an Indian arms build-up as well as India's refusal to participate in missile control agreements absent Chinese participation. [18] The difficult relationship between India and China thus increased the perceived security threat in Pakistan and created an irresolvable logistical hurdle to any India-Pakistan missile control regime. [19]
In 1990, the Bush administration imposed Pressler Amendment sanctions on Pakistan, banning military assistance to Pakistan while it maintained a nuclear weapons program. [20] Pakistani officials, noting the resulting lack of a realistic option for improving Pakistan's limited Air Force and further motivated by the Indian military's continued technological gains, concluded the necessity of intermediate-range missile development. [21] In the decade that followed, intense clandestine missile projects culminated with the successful launch of several intermediate-range missiles. In so doing, Pakistan demonstrated the effectiveness of an organizational structure characterized by contentious interagency competition between the Chinese-assisted solid-fuel PAEC program under Dr. Samar Mubarakmand and the North Korea-assisted liquid-fueled program at Khan Research Lab (KRL) under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. [22]
China, motivated in part by competition with Soviet-armed India, agreed to sell M-11 missiles, launchers, and support equipment to Pakistan in 1988. [23] SUPARCO subsequently surfaced as the destination for numerous illicit materials transfers. In 1995, the United States warned European suppliers of potential illicit procurement attempts. [24] In 1996, Taiwan and Hong Kong seized numerous shipments of several tons of Ammonium perchlorate (AP), a solid-propellant component, bound for SUPARCO from North Korea and routed through China. [25] Intelligence sources also detected numerous M-11 component deliveries to a new missile factory at Tarwanah, which itself bears a strong physical resemblance to the M-11 plant in Hebei, China. [26]
In June 1991, the Bush administration imposed missile sanction laws against SUPARCO and two Chinese firms for M-11 missile technology transfers. [27] In August 1993, the Clinton administration imposed new sanctions after discovering additional M-11 exports to Pakistan. [28] These sanctions weakened Chinese largesse, and Pakistan responded by turning to other sources. [29] In 1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who would come to regard herself as the "mother of the missile program," travelled to Pyongyang and secured the transfer of Nodong missile technology on behalf of Dr. A.Q. Khan and his solid-fueled missile development program at Khan Research Lab (KRL). [30] Fearing obsolescence, and unsuccessful through much of the 1980's, A.Q. Khan leveraged North Korean assistance to quickly transform KRL into a vibrant rival for PAEC. [31] Some report that A.Q. Khan struck additional technology transfer deals with North Korea outside the purview of Pakistan's state negotiations. [32] Circumstantial evidence points to an agreement by either the Pakistani government or A.Q. Khan to exchange nuclear secrets for missile technology. [33]
By the end of the decade, both programs would demonstrate intermediate-range missile launch capabilities. On 3 July 1997, SUPARCO successfully launched the Hatf-3/Ghaznavi missile. Analysts immediately noted design similarities with the Chinese M-11 missile; some even speculated that the Ghaznavi was merely a renamed imported M-11. [34] One year later, KRL test fired the liquid-fueled Hatf-5/Ghauri missile. Winning the race for an intermediate-range missile, KRL's Ghauri brought New Delhi within range. [35] Analysts immediately noted design similarities with the North Korean Nodong missile. [36] A year later, KRL launched the Hatf-5A/Ghauri-2, with increased range capable of striking most of India. A day later, PAEC successfully fired the Hatf-4/Shaheen-1, introducing solid-fueled intermediate-range capabilities to the Pakistani arsenal.
The successful launches of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles occurred nearly concurrently with the debut of India's Prithvi and Agni-2 missiles. The chronology of Pakistani missile tests is consistent with arms competition not only with India, but also between KRL and PAEC.
2001 to 2007: Interagency Harmonization and Technological Maturity
In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf seized power and overhauled Pakistan's nuclear command-and-control structure. [37] While the official justification for the reforms was to "establish harmony between Pakistan's poorly coordinated and competitive" agencies, some speculate that Musharraf also sought to "knock out the one person in Pakistan most likely to eclipse him: the Father of the Bomb."[38] Under the new organizational scheme, weaponization and delivery activities were transferred from PAEC and KRL to the National Development Complex (NDC). [39] While uncertainty exists about whether KRL retained the Ghauri program, NDC nevertheless now stands as Pakistan's primary missile development agency. [40]
The period between 2002 and 2006 marked a flurry of missile test-flights in a "tit-for-tat" pattern with India, with the two countries generally scheduling flight tests within days of each other and often concurrent with politically sensitive events such as elections. [41] In total, three Hatf-3/Abdali tests, six Hatf-4/Shaheen-1 tests, five Hatf-5/Ghauri-1 tests, and five Hatf-6/Shaheen-2 tests occurred. [42] By the conclusion of this period, Pakistan would claim solid-fueled capabilities of 2,000-2,500km range with 1,000kg payload, and liquid-fueled capabilities of 1,300km with a 1,000kg payload, bringing almost all of India within nuclear strike range.
Recent Developments and Current Status
In 2005, India and Pakistan signed an agreement requiring both parties to provide advance notice of any ballistic missile tests. [43] Since 2007, testing activity of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles has slowed and the majority of new developments have appeared in cruise, rather than ballistic missile systems. [44] Potential causes for this include India's investment in a ballistic missile defense system, the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles acquiring sufficient range and payload to target strategic locations in India, international pressure against intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile tests, and a shift in focus toward developing a tactical nuclear capability. [45]
The 2005 inaugural test-flight of the Hatf-7/Babur cruise missile stunned many observers for its technological complexity and its undetected development. [46] The extent of foreign assistance remains unclear —analysts identified design similarities with Chinese cruise missiles as well as American Tomahawk missiles, which previously crash-landed over Pakistan. [47] In 2007, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-8/Ra'ad cruise missile, adding air-launch missile capabilities to the Pakistan Air Force. [48] While Pakistan officially claimed that NDC indigenously developed the Hatf-8, some believe that the modest range of the missile suggests foreign assistance by a country unwilling to contravene MTCR range and payload restrictions. [49] More recently, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-9/NASR, a short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile in April 2011. Observers immediately speculated that the Hatf-9/NASR test indicated potential Pakistani intention to develop a tactical nuclear capability —an interest potentially motivated further by India's "Cold Start" doctrine. [50]
Despite flight test successes, however, analysts remain skeptical about Pakistan's indigenous design and manufacturing capabilities. The lack of robust government-industry-university R&D linkages, a known dependence on foreign suppliers for key raw materials such as steel alloys, and the technological inexperience of private industry cast doubt upon Pakistan's missile design claims. [51] While Pakistani scientists increasingly participate in basic science collaboration with foreign laboratories, such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), the country's industrial base lacks a demonstrated history of producing quality high-tech products. [52] A history of indigenous design claims refuted by intelligence sources further complicates assessments. [53] Analysts estimate that even gaining liquid propulsion expertise will take until at least 2013. [54] Thus, Pakistani missile development will likely remain dependent on foreign assistance for both materials and expertise in the near-term. Nevertheless Pakistan has maintained a successful missile acquisition strategy in spite of foreign dependence and a history of MTCR and U.S. Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act sanctions, and already boasts one of the top ten ballistic missile manufacturing capabilities in the world. [55]
Barring unprecedented industrial growth and a substantially enhanced defense-industrial base, Pakistan will likely continue its strategy of developing advanced missile systems with foreign assistance rather than pursuing the more expensive and less feasible option of pure indigenous development or advanced aircraft acquisition. [56] Continued state patronage, fueled by competition with India, the high prestige accorded to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the symbolic value of diversifying missile delivery systems will likely sustain continued missile development in Pakistan.[57]
Sources:
[1] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 213.
[2] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 118.
[3] Aaron Karp, "The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, pp. 106-122.
[4] Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion," in The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998.
[5] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan," CRS Report for Congress RL31900 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 11 March 2004); Robert Hewson, ed., "Ra'ad (Hatf 8) (Pakistan), Air-to-surface missiles — Stand-off and cruise," Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, December 2010, www.janes.com; Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 277.
[6] Missile Technology Control Regime, "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime: Canberra, Australia, 5-7 November 2008," November 2008, www.mtcr.info; U.S. Department of State, "Missile Sanction Laws," updated 4 December 2009, www.state.gov.
[7] Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011.
[8] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk.
[9] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk.
[10] "Pakistan Derives its First 'Hatf' Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets," The Risk Report, October 1995, p. 4.
[11] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk; The President of Pakistan, "SUPARCO Ordinance No. XX of 1981," Gazette of Pakistan, 21 May 1981.
[12] "Pakistan tests long-range missiles," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 February 1989, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[13] "Pakistan Derives its First 'Hatf' Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets," The Risk Report, October 1995, p. 4; and Subrahmanyan Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," Missile Montior, No 3, Spring 1993, pp. 5-6.
[14] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 213.
[15] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 118.
[16] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 213.
[17] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 125.
[18] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 116.
[19] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 123.
[20] Dianne E. Rennack, "India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress RS20995, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 3 February 2003).
[21] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 122; Dilip Ganguly, "Launch of India's First Intermediate-Range Missile Postponed," Associated Press, 20 April 1989, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; and Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 123.
[22] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009).
[23] Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2001), p. 268.
[24] Abu Sabeen, "Purchase of ballistic missile equipment; Washington warns Islamabad," Middle East Newsfile (Moneyclips), 27 May 1995 in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[25] "Taiwan confiscates chemicals bound for Pakistan," Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 28 March 2006, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; Michelle Chin and Glenn Schloss, "Customs raid uncovers huge haul of rocket fuel," South China Morning Post, 18 September 1996, p. 1; in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; and Glenn Schloss, "North Korean firm behind shipment," South China Morning Post, 13 December 1996, p. 4, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[26] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 119; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Linked To Pakistani Missile Plant; Secret Project Could Renew Sanctions Issue," Washington Post, 25 August 1996, p. A01; in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[27] Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," CRS Report for Congress RL31555, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 16 August 2010).
[28] "Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Chinese and Pakistani Entities," 56 Federal Register 137 (25 June 1991), p. 32601.
[29] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 88.
[30] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), pp. 88-89.
[31] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 89.
[32] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 96.
[33] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 90.
[34] Duncan Lennox, ed., "Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, pp. 111-112; and Duncan Lennox, ed., "Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, pp. 111-112.
[35] Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 268.
[36] "Pakistan's Missile 'was a Nodong,'" Jane's Missiles & Rockets (Surrey), 1 May 1998.
[37] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks —A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 109.
[38] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks —A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 110; and Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 277.
[39] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks —A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 110.
[40] Usman Ansari, "Pakistan Pushes To improve Missile Strike Capability," DefenseNews, 17 November 2008, www.defensenews.com.
[41] "India and Pakistan in tit-for-tat missile tests," The Guardian (London), 4 October 2002, www.guardian.co.uk.
[42] "Missile Flight Tests," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed 31 January 2011, www.iiss.org.
[43] "India, Pakistan sign missile test deal," Associated Press, 3 October 2005.
[44] Farhan Bokhari, "Pakistan test-fires medium-range ballistic missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 December 2010; Farhan Bokhari, "Pakistan test fires Shaheen 2," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 April 2008; and Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[45] Rahul Bedi, "India's AAD missile interceptor completes another successful test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 July 2010; Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011.
[46] Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[47] Robert Hewson and Andrew Koch, "Pakistan tests cruise missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 August 2005; Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[48] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan tests Hatf 8 air-launched cruise missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 September 2007.
[49] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan tests Hatf 8 air-launched cruise missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 September 2007.
[50] Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011; Chris Allbritton, "How Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be jeopardized," Reuters, 1 June 2011, accessed 8 July 2011.
[51] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, p. 19.
[52] "Pakistani, European atomic energy bodies mark 20 years of cooperation," PTV World (Islamabad), 15 December 2004.
[53] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009).
[54] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, p. 23.
[55] Dianne E. Rennack, "India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress RS20995, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 3 February 2003); and Duncan Lennox, ed., "Ballistic Missile Capabilities, Manufacturing Countries,".in Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, p. 553.
[56] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, pp. 16-26.
[57] Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion," in The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory. The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target. Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision. Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.Ballistic missile defense (BMD)
All active and passive measures designed to detect, identify, track, and defeat incoming ballistic missiles, in both strategic and theater tactical roles, during any portion of their flight trajectory (boost, post-boost, mid-course, or terminal phase) or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness in destroying their targets.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS.
0 comments:
Post a Comment