| Armed forces growth | -16 | | [89th of 132] |
| Armed forces personnel | 513,000 | | [8th of 166] |
| DEFINITION: Total armed forces (2000) |
| SOURCE: calculated on the basis of data on armed forces from IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Branches
Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force of the Military of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Niru-ye Hava'i-ye Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran; includes air defense); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, IRGC): Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Qods Force (special operations), and Basij Force (Popular Mobilization Army); Law Enforcement Forces |
| DEFINITION: The names of the ground, naval, air, marine, and other defense or security forces |
| SOURCE: IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Conscription
Conscription exists (AI). |
| DEFINITION: A description of the status of conscription in the nation in 1997. |
| SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008 |
| Conventional arms exports | $1,000,000.00 | | [37th of 40] |
| DEFINITION: Conventional arms transfers (1990 prices) - Exports (US$ millions) Refers to the voluntary transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional weapons or systems in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimetre calibre). |
| SOURCE: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC) |
| Conventional arms imports | $283,000,000.00 | | [18th of 85] |
| DEFINITION: Conventional arms transfers (1990 prices) - Imports (US$ millions) Refers to the voluntary transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional weapons or systems in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimetre calibre). |
| SOURCE: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2005. SIPRI Arms Transfers. Database. February. Stockholm. |
| expenditure > % of GDP | 4.46 % |  | [9th of 145] |
| DEFINITION: Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.) | View time series |
| SOURCE: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2005. SIPRI Arms Transfers. Database. February. Stockholm. |
| Expenditures > Dollar figure | $4,300,000,000.00 | | [19th of 111] |
| DEFINITION: Current military expenditures in US dollars; the figure is calculated by multiplying the estimated defense spending in percentage terms by the gross domestic product (GDP) calculated on an exchange rate basis not purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Dollar figures for military expenditures should be treated with caution because of different price patterns and accounting methods among nations, as well as wide variations in the strength of their currencies | View time series |
| SOURCE: World Development Indicators database |
| Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49 | 20,343,100 | | [15th of 175] |
| DEFINITION: The total numbers of males aged 15-49. This statistic assumes that every individual is fit to serve. |
| SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008 |
| Military Capabilities > Active Troops | 540,000 | | [8th of 10] |
| SOURCE: CIA World Factbook, 28 July 2005 |
| Military Capabilities > Defense Budget | $4,300,000,000.00 | | [7th of 10] |
| SOURCE: Wikipedia: Military Capabilities |
| Military Capabilities > Military Capabilities > Frigates | 3 | | [9th of 10] |
| DEFINITION: |
| SOURCE: Wikipedia: Military Capabilities |
| Military Capabilities > Tanks | 1,613 | | [9th of 10] |
| SOURCE: Wikipedia: Military Capabilities |
| personnel | 585,000 | | [11th of 170] |
| DEFINITION: Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. | View time series |
| SOURCE: Wikipedia: Military Capabilities |
| personnel > % of total labor force | 2.12 % | | [34th of 168] |
| DEFINITION: Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population. | View time series |
| SOURCE: World Development Indicators database |
Service age and obligation
19 years of age for compulsory military service; 16 years of age for volunteers; 17 years of age for Law Enforcement Forces; 15 years of age for Basij Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); conscript military service obligation - 18 months; women exempt from military service |
| DEFINITION: This entry gives the required ages for voluntary or conscript military service and the length of sevice obligation. | View time series |
| SOURCE: World Development Indicators database |
| Weapon holdings | 5,901,000 | | [14th of 137] |
| SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008 |
WMD > Missile
Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East and has acquired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. It has purchased North Korean Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs, and Nodong ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, Iran has also developed short-range artillery rockets and is producing the Scud-B and the Scud-C—called the Shehab-1 and Shehab-2, respectively. Iran recently flight-tested the 1,300 km-range Shehab-3, which is based on the North Korean Nodong. The Shehab-3 is capable of reaching Israel. Following this most recent flight-test, the Shehab-3 was placed in service and revolutionary guard units were officially armed with the missiles. There are conflicting reports about the development of even longer-ranged missiles, such as the Shehab-4 and the Kosar intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). U.S. intelligence agencies assess that barring acquisition of a complete system or major subsystem from North Korea, Iran is unlikely to launch an ICBM or satellite launch vehicle (SLV) before mid-decade. At present, Iran's capabilities in missile production have kept in line with its doctrine of protection from regional threats. Iran has developed new missiles including the Ra'ad and Kosar and continues to test its Nodong based, Shehab-3 missile. On October 20, 2004, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani confirmed the latest successful test of Iran’s Shehab-3 with a 2,000-kilometer range in front of observers. Iran has openly declared its ability to mass produce the Shehab-3 medium-range missile. Intelligence reports regarding Iran's expansion of capabilities and persistent interest in acquiring new technologies have led the United States to seek other options in dealing with Iran as a regional threat. |
| DEFINITION: A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction |
| SOURCE: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) |
WMD > Nuclear
By early June 2005, the EU-3 (France, Great Britain, and Germany) had not yet submitted their proposal to Iran outlining future nuclear negotiations. The EU-3 requested a delay in negotiations, but Tehran rejected the delay and publicly announced it would resume peaceful nuclear research activities. At issue was Iran's insistance that right to peaceful nuclear research be included in any proposal, a position the United States adamantly opposed. Attempts were made to persuade Iran to give up its fuel cycle ambitions and accept nuclear fuel from abroad, but Tehran made it clear that any proposal that did not guarantee Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology would lead to the cessation of all nuclear related negotiations with the EU-3. In addition, members of the Iranian Majlis, scientists, scholars, and students were protesting and holding rallies to encourage the government to lift the suspension on uranium enrichment and to not succumb to foreign (U.S.) pressure. One week later, Iran once again agreed to temporarily freeze its nuclear program until the end of July when the European Union agreed it would submit a proposal for the next roud of talks. In June, IAEA Deputy Director Pierre Goldschmidt stated that Iran admitted to providing incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran claimed all such research ceased in 1993, but results from recent tests show experiments took place as late as 1995 and 1998. In early July, Iran asked the IAEA if it could break UN seals and test nuclear-related equipment, stating the testing would not violate Tehran's voluntary suspension of nuclear activities. At the end of July, an official letter was submitted to the IAEA stating that the seals at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) would be removed. The IAEA requested that it be given 10 days to install the necessary surveillance equipment. On 1 August, Iran reminded the EU-3 that 3 August would be the last opportunity for a proposal to be submitted to continue negotiations. A few days later, the European Union submitted the Framework for a Long-term Agreement proposal to Iran. The proposal specifically called on Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity. Tehran immediately rejected the proposal as a negation of its inalienable rights. On 8 August, nuclear activities resumed at the Isfahan UCF and two days later, IAEA seals were removed from the remaining parts of the process lines with IAEA inspectors present. In the days leading up to Iran's resumption of nuclear activities, several countries called on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities. Additionally, some European countries and the United States threatened to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. Once again, Iran rejected any proposal related to the suspension of conversion activities, but stated they were ready to continue negotiations. Tehran did not believe there was any legal basis for referral to the UN Security council and believed it was only a political move. Iran also threatened to stop all negotiations, prevent any further inspections at all its nuclear facilities, suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol, and withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), if it was referred to the UN Security Council. In August 2005, the IAEA announced that most of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) particle contamination found at various locations in Iran were found to be of foreign origin. The IAEA concluded much of the HEU found on centrifuge parts were from imported Pakistani equipment, rather than from any enrichment activities conducted by Iran. In late August, Iran began announcing it would be resuming nuclear activities in Natanz and that Tehran would be willing to negotiate as long as there were no conditions. In August, Iran refused to comply with a resolution from the IAEA to halt its nuclear program, stating that making nuclear fuel was its right as a member of the NPT. The European Union believed that although Iran did have a right to nuclear energy under Article 4 of the NPT, it had lost that right because it violated Article 2 of the NPT - "not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear related weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." On 24 September 2005, the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance of the NPT. The resolution passed with 21 votes of approval, 12 abstentions, and one opposing vote. Russia and China were among those that abstained from voting and Venezuela was the only country to vote against the resolution. The resolution stated Iran's non-compliance due to "many failures and breaches" over nuclear safeguards of the NPT were grounds for referral to the UN Security Council. |
| DEFINITION: A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons |
| SOURCE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative |
WMD > Overview
Iran's chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, and possibly its nuclear weapon program and biological warfare capabilities, are meant to deter opponents and to gain influence in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions. The acquisition and creation of these various weapon systems can also be seen as a response to Iran's own experience as a victim of chemical and missile attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. |
| DEFINITION: An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction |
| SOURCE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative |
... View all Military stats SOURCES: calculated on the basis of data on armed forces from IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press; IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press; All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC); SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2005. SIPRI Arms Transfers. Database. February. Stockholm.; World Development Indicators database; CIA World Factbook, 28 July 2005; Wikipedia: Military Capabilities; Wikipedia: Military Capabilities ; Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC); The Nuclear Threat Initiative ALTERNATIVE NAMES: Iran, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran, iran (islamic rep. of), iran (islamic republic of), Iran, Islamic Rep. of, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Islamic Rep. of Iran Related links:More facts and figures on Iran |
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